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BRICS set out vision for international information security 
The forthcoming BRICS summit will articulate a new collective 
vision of global information security but there are reasons to 
doubt its viability as a united front. 
In July 2015, the BRICS group – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – will 
meet in the Russian Republic of Bashkortostan for its seventh annual summit. 
Under Russian presidency, the BRICS agenda will reflect common concerns about 
global political and economic affairs, as well as the specific strategic ambitions of its 
members.  
One key area in which the BRICS group aims to make an international impact is 
information security. A new collective vision of ‘international information security’ (IIS) 
is emerging from pre-summit meetings and diplomatic statements – part turf war, 
part muscle-flexing riposte to a United States damaged by the Snowden affair.  
Sovereign Data assesses these developments and finds that there are serious 
disagreements between BRICS countries about the meaning and future contours of 
internet governance. If these differences cannot be resolved, the prospects for a 
truly unified and credible BRICS information security project will be limited.  
Background 
BRICS group members are no strangers to information security issues, but speaking 
in unison on the topic is a new development. The Russian presidency states that 
BRICS has become an influential global actor with ‘its own voice’ on security issues. 
Information security cooperation may have been lacking historically but Russia 
notes that IIS is one of two areas (the other being regional conflicts) where BRICS 
cooperation has advanced the most. The ambition is for BRICS to become a global 
player in information security and internet governance.1 This reaffirms the 
‘paramount importance’ attached to the security of information and information 
technologies at previous BRICS summits and the role of BRICS in developing legal, 
behavioural and normative change in this key policy field. 
In May 2015, BRICS national security advisors agreed to prepare ‘common 
approaches to information security’, informed by a reformed system of global 
governance that promotes ‘cooperative, equal, and indivisible security’.2 This 
modifies the 2013 BRICS commitment to a ‘peaceful, secure, and open 
cyberspace’.3 There is also a toning-down of the 2014 diplomatic language that 
criticised the United States for the mass surveillance and data collection activities of 
its intelligence services.  
The Fortaleza Declaration of July 2014, for instance, framed this activity as the 
‘violation of the sovereignty of States and of human rights’.4  In the wake of the 
Snowden disclosures Brazil’s president Rouseff excoriated the US before the UN 
General Assembly and has been at the forefront of international condemnation of 
US intelligence policy and practice.5  Brazil and its BRICS allies have even planned 
to lay their own internet cables to avoid routing internet traffic through the United 
States.6 In 2015, the BRICS articulate only the desire to ‘internationalise’ internet 
governance, a less obviously disputatious salvo against American dominance.7
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The BRICS group has always sought to challenge the hegemony of the United 
States in global affairs. In 2009 it transformed from an abstract economic category 
into a self-identifying political group, enabling its challenge to Western neoliberal 
capitalism and the economic crisis.8 Recent declarations support this interpretation 
of BRICS intent. The BRICS group means to create ‘a multipolar system of 
international relations based on the principles of justice and equality … laying the 
old practices of bloc diplomacy to rest’.9 Russia’s aim is to transform BRICS into ‘a 
full-scale mechanism for strategic and day-to-day cooperation on key issues of 
world politics and global economy’.10 
There are tensions that belie the apparent unity of this emerging geopolitical bloc. 
Since its creation, the heterogeneity of the states that make up the BRICS group 
suggests that its ability to articulate, let alone achieve, any ‘meaningful vision for the 
future’ is limited.11 A closer assessment of the emerging BRICS information security 
agenda reveals that there is significant internal variation in the ways BRICS 
members understand and articulate key concepts and ideals. This could impact on 
the ability of BRICS to achieve stated ambitions. 
 
Behind the façade 
The BRICS countries have divergent conceptions of sovereignty and cyberspace. 
These differences have less to do with technical information security – or ‘cyber’ 
security – than with the central question of internet governance: who should rule the 
internet? Each of the BRICS countries’ position on the issue is defined by the 
relationship between two things: first, the role of the state in internet governance; 
and second, how much and what kind of formal organisation is needed to solve 
problems of internet governance.12 
The former rests on the extent to which the internet should be subject to national 
sovereignty or considered a global domain. For the latter, there are two extremes: a 
hierarchical (and hence coercive) approach to internet governance, or a more 
distributed, networked arrangement for decision-making. This framework allows for 
a great number of variations, but each of the BRICS countries can be described in 
terms of one of four basic types.13 
China and Russia, for example, are ‘cyber-reactionaries’, conservative entities 
aligning internet governance with state jurisdiction. This promotes the supremacy of 
national institutions and mechanisms over the internet, and preserves greatest 
freedom of movement for the state in domestic and foreign policy. Information 
security is closely identified with national security and the preservation of national 
identity and culture. It therefore takes on an explicitly nationalist tone usually absent, 
for example, in formulations of ‘cyber security’. Information refers not only to data 
but to ideas and cultural contaminants damaging to the national body politic.  
China and Russia support each other’s ambitions, recently reaffirming their bilateral 
cooperation on ‘network and information security’, and pledging to respect the 
other’s ‘choice of developmental path conforming to its national conditions’.14  This 
links national sovereignty tightly to control and authority over internet content and 
activities, including censorship. Cyber-reactionary states work through inter-
governmental organisations where necessary, in order to promote this form of 
internet governance. In the case of China and Russia, this includes the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), a UN agency. 
Brazil prefers a ‘global governmentality’ approach, which also requires hierarchical 
control of the internet but by transnational institutions rather than states. Brazil led 
the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance 
(NETmundial) in April 2014. This was attended by delegates from governments, 
private sector, academia, civil society and non-profit organisations, and drafted 
broad-based principles for internet governance and proposed a roadmap for their 
implementation.15  
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India and South Africa are proponents of ‘denationalised liberalism’, in which 
individual actors govern the internet via transnational decision-making frameworks. 
This is a peer- and market-based approach that restricts hierarchical interventions to 
policing and national security functions. India’s position can be attributed to its 
status as a leader in the global market in outsourced information technology. Growth 
has slowed in recent years but outsourcing remains a key sector of Indian industry 
and a crucial source of foreign currency.16   
These descriptions suggest key areas of potential disagreement in the midst of an 
intensely complex situation. Given the risk of fracture, what are the prospects for a 
workable BRICS consensus on global information security?  
Implications 
The potential emergence of a BRICS information security project is not a response 
to US dominance alone. It is also an attempt to broker new consensus where none 
currently exists. There is no globally binding agreement on information security or 
internet governance, and the entities that exert control and authority are non-
governmental organisations like ICANN that have evolved in ad hoc fashion along 
with the internet itself.17 In broad terms, agreements have foundered on the simple 
fact that the US has seen no need for them. Without US buy-in, no global regime for 
internet governance is either likely to take hold or enforceable in practice. The US 
prefers an ‘open internet’ approach to facilitate commerce and cultural exports, even 
if its military and intelligence activities indicate that national security is often its 
overriding consideration. It also supports the globalisation of some internet 
governance functions historically closely tied to the US government.18  
Opposition to the US model has come principally from Russia and China and other 
members of the SCO, particularly the SCO’s International Code of Conduct for 
Information Security (2011), updated in 2015.19 Lesser proposals have come from 
the IBSA sub-grouping (India, Brazil, South Africa), rooted in documents on global 
‘information society’ like the 2003 Brasilia Declaration.20 BRICS countries have 
tended to operate via either the SCO or IBSA, rather than in concert. Analysts 
identify the split between the SCO and Western democracies but less attention is 
paid to divisions within the BRICS group, in which there are deep-rooted differences 
between Russia and China on the one hand and the IBSA countries on the other.21 
Under these conditions, the prospects of a BRICS consensus on internet 
governance and security look limited. While Russia and China pursue robust 
bilateral security agreements, questions are being raised in South Africa about 
intensifying ties with China on information security issues.22 Brazil has no wish to 
damage good relations with the US, not least as their respective national priorities 
for the internet are so closely aligned. India has more to lose than gain by adopting 
restrictive models of internet governance. So too China, which reaps enormous 
economic benefit from its connections to the global internet. It may be that 
cooperation in this policy space is limited by the same factors that have always 
hampered it: ingrained differences in culture and outlook; intra-BRICS competition; 
and the strategic importance of the United States to all members.23 
 
Outlook 
How the BRICS balance these competing visions of the future internet depends on 
how well its members navigate the role of the state in internet governance. Three of 
the BRICS ‘group of five’ converge intuitively with US views, which priorities Russia 
and China as traditional strategic foes. Such polarisation may be an insurmountable 
obstacle to consensus, at least in any framework that possesses the necessary bite 
to convince other governments and stakeholders to follow the BRICS lead. If they 
cannot muster this support, the BRICS proposals will look somewhat underpowered 
and are likely to fail. BRICS is not looking for radical change in the global order but 
the challenge before it is to engender any change at all. 
It may be that cooperation in 
this policy space is limited by 
the same factors that have 
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outlook; intra-BRICS 
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